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Extra info for Central Banking in Eastern Europe (Routledge International Studies in Money and Banking)
The bliss point B for country one is where it makes no adjustment (˜ ϭ 0) but country two obligingly inﬂates sufﬁciently to keep its output at its natural rate. B* is an analogous bliss point for country two. 3b). In the nonco-operative case each country takes the other country’s inﬂation rate as given which maps out reaction functions BN and B*N. The nonco-operative equilibrium is at the intersection N of these curves. Paretoefﬁcient points lie along the contract curve BCB*. If the monetary authorities were to co-operate over the joint choice of inﬂation rates they would bargain over outcomes along the contract curve Pareto-superior to N, the shaded region.
7) with b ϭ bR with employment at its natural rate. Similarly if p ϭ 0, and employment, again, is at its natural rate. The main results up to this point are summarized as: Proposition 2 Assuming weights bL Ͼ bR Ն b for a Right government-dependent CB, a Left government-dependent CB and an independent CB respectively, the corresponding inﬂation biases and employment, in the absence of shocks, satisfy ෆ L Ͼ R Ն ෆ , lෆ ϭ 0 and lෆ Ն 0. So far so good, but as yet we have produced no real insights over those of the partisan political business cycle literature for the closed economy.
In what follows we assume the government does this in such a way as to minimize its own welfare loss function. The CB is subsequently goal- and instrument-independent, and pursues a discretionary policy corresponding to its own preferences. An alternative interpretation of choosing b Ͻ bm is that it represents the degree of central bank independence. A completely independent bank would eliminate the inﬂuence of the government over monetary policy. Then, assuming that bankers are naturally very conservative, the result would be a choice of the weight b close to zero.